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July 21, 2005

Why everyone believes in root causes

Two recent articles about the motivations of terrorist attacks take two starkly different approaches. Fred Kaplan carefully and patiently reviews three new studies to make the case that most terrorists "are motivated not so much by Islamic fantasies of the caliphate's restoration and the snuffing of freedom, but rather by resistance to foreign occupation of Arab lands." Meanwhile, Norman Geras sputters and spits his way through a rant (adapted, you won't be surprised, from a blog post) the gist of which is that people like Kaplan have no right to consider facts and research when it comes to terrorism, and that one must only condemn terrorist attacks, not try to figure out how to stop them -- at least not if that means trying to understand what causes them in the first place.

Of course, Kaplan is careful to say that "understanding is not the same as excusing," but Geras just scoffs that liberals always say that, when really they're always "seeking to dissipate responsibility for atrocity, mass murder, crime against humanity." To Geras, the selective manner in which "root-cause advocacy" is deployed proves that it is always partisan and cynical. To illustrate this, he reaches for some hypothetical story about immigrants from Zimbabwe. But why bring Zimbabwe into this? Here's a hypothetical grounded firmly in Iraq that makes a similar point, but with a very different result.

Before the invasion of Iraq, the left warned that a messy war would turn Iraq into a recruiting ground and rallying cry for terrorists, making us less safe in the long run. The right, on the other hand, warned that leaving Saddam in power would allow him to provide material support for terrorists, making us less safe in the long run.

Now let's imagine that the universe splits at this point. In one reality -- our reality -- the invasion goes ahead and everything the left warned of comes to pass. The left points this out and the right screams bloody murder about the "apologists." Meanwhile, in a parallel universe, the US opts for containment rather than invasion. And two years later, a terror cell trained in Iraq and covertly supplied by Saddam's regime carries out an attack. Can you imagine for a second that the right would not cry "we told you so!" but would instead say that linking any attack to previous US actions is inherently unacceptable -- and insist that even raising the question of whether that previous action was a good idea in retrospect is an immoral attempt to justify terrorism?

Saying we shouldn't end the occupation of Iraq because that's what the terrorists want is as stupid as saying that we should do so because if we give the terrorists what they want, they'll stop attacking us. Why should our policies be based on what terrorists want one way or the other? Our only option is to figure out, as we should have done before the war, what will make us safer (as opposed to what obviously is not) and do it, without worrying about what the terrorists think. Kaplan happens to think pulling out of Iraq now will make matters worse. There are persuasive arguments to the contrary as well. But to say that we're not even going to consider it because the terrorists want it that way is to abbrogate our foreign policy to Al Qaida, and that's unacceptable. As is viciously attacking anyone who tries to make the argument you disagree with when all you have to offer is ill-informed invective.

Posted by Daniel Radosh

Comments

Typically I find those, like Geras, with hostility towards the very idea of causation to be those most afraid that under a regime of increased knowledge of what makes people tick their behaviors will be authoritatively recognized as pathological before they get public office, a publishing position, or a thinktank sinecure. And that, god forbid, educational institutions would act to modify and treat those behaviors in the young before a new generation of cranks rises to comfort and succor their elders. This segues into Creationism, National Education Standards, and Scientology but not now. Not now.

Philosophers sometimes call this idea "unfree responsibility." We might understand what determines causes, but we are still held accountable for them. Perhaps its a bit too complicated for Geras.

Philosophers sometimes call this idea "unfree responsibility." We might understand what determines causes, but we are still held accountable for them. Perhaps its a bit too complicated for Geras.

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